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Feasible future global scenarios for human life
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Subjective well-being surveys show large and consistent variation among countries, much of
which can be predicted from a small number of social and economic proxy variables. But the
degree to which these life evaluations might feasibly change over coming decades, at the
global scale, has not previously been estimated. Here, we use observed historical trends in
the proxy variables to constrain feasible future projections of self-reported life evaluations to
the year 2050. We ﬁnd that projected effects of macroeconomic variables tend to lead to
modest improvements of global average life evaluations. In contrast, scenarios based on non-
material variables project future global average life evaluations covering a much wider range,
lying anywhere from the top 15% to the bottom 25% of present-day countries. These results
highlight the critical role of non-material factors such as social supports, freedoms, and
fairness in determining the future of human well-being.
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Complex policy decisions, ranging from international cli-mate change negotiations to investments in education orinfrastructure, often rely on projections of readily quan-
tiﬁed material outcomes such as per capita income to assess the
impacts on human welfare, for example, refs. 1,2. An alternative
approach, developed over the past few decades, aims to apply
more direct measures of human experience that integrate many
dimensions of life according to those living it. These well-being
measures have the disadvantage of being subjective, and
can therefore be difﬁcult to interpret. Nevertheless, they have
been shown to be consistent with external evaluations at the
individual level, are reproducible over time within populations,
and are increasingly embraced by decision makers as a leading
objective3–7. They also show consistent predictive relationships
with other societal variables.
Here, we focus on one measure of subjective well-being (SWB)
with particularly consistent predictive relationships: the cognitive
evaluation of life. Annual, near-global national samples of self-
reported life evaluations, from Gallup’s World Poll, have recently
become available through the World Happiness Report. While the
Poll’s extensive questionnaire is not designed expressly for explaining
differences in life quality, it does contain several questions which
address dimensions of life known to be important to life evaluation.
Prior work in a range of contexts has shown that, among these,
income differences have signiﬁcant explanatory power in accounting
for variation in life evaluations, while less tangible aspects of human
experience can account for as much or more of the variation8; see
Supplementary Note 1. Following Helliwell et al.8, we account for a
portion of international differences in life evaluation using four proxy
variables derived from the Gallup World Poll, which we will refer to
as reﬂecting non-material factors (corruption9, freedom, giving10,
and social support), and two proxy variables reﬂecting material
factors (per capita gross domestic product (GDP) and life expec-
tancy). When these measures are included in a simple linear model
of cross-country differences, they explain roughly three-quarters of
the variation among annual national averages of life evaluations, and
parameters are estimated with high statistical precision, as shown by
prior work8; see Supplementary Note 2 for details.
Static inter-country comparisons such as these have been the
focus of much attention, but they do not address how the life
evaluations of humans might change in the future, an important
consideration for motivating and evaluating policy decisions.
Although there is no mechanistic understanding on which to
reliably predict these future changes directly, the time-span cov-
ered by the Gallup World Poll (2005–2016) is now sufﬁcient to
use as an empirical constraint on the feasible rates at which proxy
variables might change, and reveals that strong trends have
occurred in some countries (Supplementary Figure 1). The por-
tion of life evaluations that can be predicted from the proxy
variables would be expected to change accordingly, providing a
means by which to estimate the range within which the future
trajectories of life evaluations are most likely to fall.
Here, we use the historical survey data to develop a dynamic
statistical model and evaluate feasible rates of change, and con-
struct simple scenarios for human life evaluations in 2050, within
the time frame commonly considered in forward-looking policies
informed by climate model projections11–16. We ﬁnd that sig-
niﬁcant changes in global average life evaluations are feasible, and
could be either positive or negative. In addition, we ﬁnd these
future outcomes to have a markedly larger dependence on non-
material proxy variables as compared with material ones.
Results
Proxy model of life evaluations. Our statistical models predict a
portion of the observed changes in life evaluations from the proxy
variables using both static (across countries, XS) and dynamic
(within countries comparing two periods, 2P) models (Fig. 1, see
Supplementary Note 2 for details). As compared with the static
XS model of differences across countries (Fig. 1a), the dynamic 2P
model of within-country changes shows a relatively greater
emphasis on freedom to make decisions, availability of social
support, and perception of corruption. The coefﬁcients in Fig. 1a,
b are normalized to standard deviations, meaning that a 1 s.d.
change in income predicts a 0.19 s.d. change of life evaluations,
holding other factors constant, while a 1 s.d. change in social
support predicts a 0.29 s.d. change in life evaluation. In our
projections, below, we use the dynamic model (2P) to predict
changes in life evaluation over several decades, though as dis-
cussed later, our main ﬁndings would be even more pronounced
were the XS model coefﬁcients to be used. We emphasize that the
projections that emerge are not predictions of the future, but
illustrate the range of the most feasible futures that might occur,
depending on human actions.
Projected range of global mean changes. The range of feasible
outcomes spanned by the three sets of scenarios is shown in
Fig. 2. Two sets of scenarios relate to changes in material con-
ditions. For the ﬁrst of these sets (Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) projections), both the
optimistic (strong-growth) and pessimistic (weak-growth) pro-
jections show improvements of global average experienced life
evaluation compared with the 2016 value of 5.24 out of 10. The
optimistic case of the second material-factors pair (Material
Trends) is characterized by steady growth at the 90th percentile of
recently observed trends (4%/year for income and 0.55 years/year
for healthy life expectancy), and this scenario’s outcome agrees
very closely with the optimistic OECD estimate. However, not all
countries have actually experienced positive real economic
growth. As a result, the corresponding pessimistic Material
Trends scenario, using 10th percentile observed trends, admits
the possibility of a small decline of global average life evaluations,
to 5.1, by 2050.
The range of feasible outcomes encompassed by these material
scenario sets is dwarfed by the range of outcomes in the non-
material scenario set. In the top 10% of recent observed trends,
freedom and social support grew at 2%/year and 0.6%/year,
respectively, while corruption decreased at 1.3%/year. At these
rates, our Non-material Trends scenario projects a radical global
mean improvement of life evaluation to 6.9, which—for
comparison—is close to the levels actually reported by Belgium
and Costa Rica in 2016, when they had the 18th and 14th highest
life evaluations17. Conversely, if the least favorable 10th percentile
of observed non-material trends were to prevail in all countries,
our projections suggest that the drop in life evaluations by 2050
would take the global average to 3.4, below the level of Egypt and
India in 2016, when they ranked 118th and 120th out of 157
countries.
Figure 2 also shows our projections based on 30th and 70th
percentile recent trends. These provide very similar qualitative
conclusions as our primary analysis, in that the Non-material
Trend scenarios encompass more extreme positive and negative
possibilities than the material trends. Notably, the 30th to 70th
percentile Material Trend projections span a similar range of life
evaluations as that of the OECD-derived projections, although the
trend-based projections are approximately 0.3 points lower than
the OECD projections.
Geography of projected changes. We map the distribution of
projected changes in life evaluation in our material OECD and
Non-material Trend scenarios, according to population density
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projections for 2050, in Fig. 3 (the corresponding Material Trend
scenarios, which are uniform across countries, are shown in
Supplementary Figures 2–5). For the non-material scenarios, we
show only the most optimistic (90th percentile) and pessimistic
(10th percentile) projections. The OECD’s material scenarios are
driven by national changes in per capita income, since in our 2P
model life expectancy has no signiﬁcant effect on life evaluations.
In general, the OECD projections show some degree of
improvement in all countries, even under pessimistic assump-
tions. Differences among countries reﬂect the details of the
OECD’s macroeconomic projections and reﬂect an expectation of
economic convergence, that is, higher economic growth rates in
countries with lower initial income.
Compared to the OECD projections, the non-material
projection maps show a much wider range of possible changes,
as did the global averages. In the optimistic non-material future,
improvements of more than 1.5 on the 11-point life evaluation
scale are widespread, including in densely populated regions of
India, China, eastern Europe, and sub-Saharan Africa. The scope
for improvement in non-material factors is smaller in western
Europe and North America, given that these countries are already
closer to the maximum values. Nonetheless, the improvements in
predicted life evaluation that would appear to be feasible due to
non-material changes by 2050 exceed those of even the most
optimistic material changes in all countries.
The pessimistic projections show an even starker difference
between material and non-material futures. Whereas the
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Fig. 1 Predictions of life evaluations from proxy variables. a Six predictor variables are used simultaneously to predict life evaluations in static cross-section
between countries (XS). All corresponding country-year observations are used, after removing global year-to-year changes. Effect sizes are shown, with
90% conﬁdence intervals, normalized to standard deviations, in order to compare the estimated coefﬁcients across predictor variables. The strongest
predictor is the income variable, but all predictors have signiﬁcant strength, and their conﬁdence intervals largely overlap. b As in a but for the dynamic,
two-period model (2P) which explains changes over time within countries. In the 2P model, conﬁdence intervals are looser, and the income coefﬁcient
excludes zero with only ~90% conﬁdence intervals. However, models for annual changes (see Supplementary Information) show similar patterns and have
tighter conﬁdence intervals. c The relationship between observed and predicted changes in life evaluation using the 2P model. The changes are the
differences in national average life evaluations between 2005–2007 and 2014–2016. Symbol size corresponds to the population size of each country
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Fig. 2 Projected feasible life evaluations in 2050 scenarios. The results of
two sets of material scenarios are shown for the year 2050, based on
macroeconomic projections (OECD, orange) and recent trends (purple), as
well as a set of non-material scenarios based on recent trends (green). The
central vertical lines indicate projections based on the median trends, the
thick horizontal bar indicates the range based on the 30th to 70th %ile
trends, and the thinner horizontal bar indicates the range based on the 10th
to 90th %ile trends. Outcomes are calculated with coefﬁcients from the 2P
model and are weighted by projected population sizes to aggregate across
countries. The red arrow indicates the population-weighted average life
evaluation recorded in 2016
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pessimistic OECD projections do not produce negative outcomes
in any countries, feasible changes in non-material variables could
produce a large decrease in life evaluation in any country by 2050.
This reﬂects the fact that, in recent years, the social variables have
had large negative trends in many countries, whereas material
variables are generally expected to improve, or at least remain
stable everywhere.
Discussion
Our analysis suggests that large future changes in global life
evaluations are feasible, and could be either positive or negative,
based on the observed changes of proxy variables within countries
during 2005–2016. Our scenarios treat material and non-material
proxy variables independently, so that the modeled changes dis-
cussed above are additive. For instance, using the OECD and 10/
90 percentile Non-material Trends, the combined feasible chan-
ges give a range of projected 2050 global average life evaluations
from 3.9 to 7.6. Regardless of whether the material trends or
OECD projections are used, the major part of the summed ranges
is due to the non-material factors, because the range of material
rates of change is smaller, relative to their modeled impact on life
evaluations, than the range of rates of change of the non-material
variables. Thus, non-material variables can feasibly make larger
impacts than income on a multi-decadal timeframe.
Furthermore, we earlier emphasized that variance-standardized
effect sizes are larger for non-material factors than material fac-
tors in the 2P dynamic model, while income is the strongest
predictor in the cross-sectional model. However, the raw coefﬁ-
cients have the opposite relationship, in that the ratio of raw effect
size of income to raw effect size of social support (or to any of
our other non-material variables) is larger for the 2P dynamic
model than the cross-sectional model. Therefore, carrying out
projections for long-run changes using coefﬁcients from the
cross-sectional model results in even starker dominance by
non-material factors.
Speculatively, our model may overestimate the role of GDP per
capita for another reason. A well-studied phenomenon ﬁrst
noticed by Easterlin18 is related to the smaller predictive role of
income in explaining long-run variation as compared with annual
changes19. Human life evaluations appear to adapt to the ambient
material afﬂuence over time, in the sense that our mental beneﬁt
gradually accommodates to the experienced level20,21. This con-
trasts with social aspects of life, for which there is little evidence
of such adaptation22. In a second phenomenon, humans respond
to material consumption norms set by those around them. Both
phenomena help to explain the lack of long-run response of life
evaluations at the national level to rising incomes during eco-
nomic growth, for example, refs. 19,23, and may explain the dif-
ference in raw coefﬁcient sizes mentioned above. Furthermore,
life evaluations may be sensitive to national (as opposed to local)
rank of afﬂuence. Such positional concerns would imply an even
smaller long-run direct beneﬁt from aggregate economic growth
across all countries, because even the cross-sectional distribution
of life evaluations would reﬂect in part the outcome of a long-run
zero-sum game.
In further support of the importance of non-material factors,
we point out that, during the period of observations, the global
mean of life evaluations did not change signiﬁcantly, despite an
average increase of incomes by 17% and lengthening of life
expectancy by 2.6 years (Supplementary Tables 1–3). The global
improvements in material conditions, which were accompanied
by improvements in average freedom and corruption, were
counteracted by a decrease in average social support, and the
reported change in global lifeevaluations was negligible.
Although we have focused here on subjective life evaluation, we
undertook an identical model-building and projection procedure
for affect measures, which capture day-to-day feelings. A pre-
dictive model based on the six proxy variables does not capture as
much of the variation in affect as the models for life evaluation8
(see Supplementary Tables 4–7). Nonetheless, with this caveat in
mind, the trend-based projections suggest that the average affect
balance of humans in 2050 could decrease by as much as 0.28 or
increase by as much as 0.31 on a two-point scale within the 90th
to 10th percentile trends, spanning 30% of the total range, very
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Fig. 3 Geographic distribution of feasible life evaluation changes. Projections for 2050 are for the OECD material growth scenarios (a, b), and scenarios in
which the non-material predictor variables change at the 10th and 90th percentile rates of recent observations among all countries (c, d). Coefﬁcients used
in the projection are based on the two-period model of life evaluations. The shading on the map is weighted by projected population density
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similar to the relative magnitude of feasible changes in life eva-
luations. Furthermore, the changes in affect are dependent
exclusively on non-material factors, with no discernible inﬂuence
of material changes (see Supplementary Note 2). Thus, large
changes in affect are also feasible, could also be positive or
negative, and appear to be exclusively dependent on non-material
factors.
We would emphasize that the predictor variables we use are
proxies, rather than direct mechanistic drivers of life evaluation.
There are many dimensions of material supports, such as nutri-
tion, shelter, and infrastructure, which may not vary directly with
per capita GDP. Provision of these material needs may also help
to build trust, support systems among family and communities,
and freedom of choice. Likewise, our non-material proxies do not
capture all of the dimensions of social experience known to be
important for life evaluations, and a breakdown of these non-
material conditions likely imperils the material ones24. In order to
address the possibility that these interactions are statistically
important, we repeated our analysis using models augmented
with a series of interaction (also know as moderation) terms
between pairs of predictors with statistically signiﬁcant effects in
our 2P model. These tests, which are detailed in Supplementary
Note 3 and Supplementary Table 8, suggest a statistically sig-
niﬁcant interaction between GDP and freedom of choice, but this
interaction does not alter our general conclusions nor the greater
importance of non-material factors (see Supplementary Figure 1).
Nevertheless, we recognize that our results remain limited by the
use of a global model with six predictors that are, unavoidably,
inter-related. In the future, the accumulation of larger databases
could allow the development of a formal model selection process
to choose among broader possibilities of predictor variables, and
may ultimately allow the development of mechanistic models
with greater predictive power.
Despite the simpliﬁcations inherent in this ﬁrst attempt to
project future human well-being, our results show that the
greatest beneﬁts to be potentially made over the next decades, as
well as the most dangerous pitfalls to be avoided, lie in the
domain of social fabric. Focusing on income among the effects of
long-run policy is therefore too narrow, and misses the majority
of the human well-being effects that could feasibly occur, based
on past experience. Given that the policies known to support a
strong social fabric can differ from those focused on economic
growth, our results suggest that scarce resources may be better
prioritized towards explicitly social aims if human well-being is
the goal.
Methods
Survey data. Following recent World Happiness Reports, we include a measure of
income along with variables representing healthy life expectancy (life expectancy),
perceived level of corruption (corruption), freedom to choose (freedom), pre-
valence of donating to others (giving), and availability of informal social support
(social support). The English wording of the life evaluation question is “Please
imagine a ladder, with steps numbered from 0 at the bottom to 10 at the top. The
top of the ladder represents the best possible life for you and the bottom of the
ladder represents the worst possible life for you. On which step of the ladder would
you say you personally feel you stand at this time?” The social support variable is
the national average of dichotomous responses to “If you were in trouble, do you
have relatives or friends you can count on to help you whenever you need them, or
not?” The freedom variable is the national average of dichotomous responses to
“Are you satisﬁed or dissatisﬁed with your freedom to choose what you do with
your life?” The corruption variable is the national average of dichotomous answers
to two questions: “Is corruption widespread throughout the government or not?”
and “Is corruption widespread within businesses or not?” In order to isolate the
prevalence for giving from the variation in ﬁnancial capacities, national mean
responses to “Have you donated money to a charity in the past month?” are
regressed on GDP per capita, and the residual becomes the Giving variable25.
Further descriptions and important notes for these variables are given in the sta-
tistical appendix for Chapter 2 of the 2017 report8. Our measure of income is the
natural logarithm of internationally comparable (i.e., purchasing power parity)
GDP per person; this measure has a relatively good linear ﬁt with life evaluations,
for example, ref. 26. By considering these measures at the aggregate (country) level,
we best capture the sum of individual effects and those which come from public
goods (at national and subsidiary scales) and from social and contextual effects at
all spatial scales up to the country level. Our use of country-level data is motivated
by the assumption that externalities (e.g., positional effects, or public goods) are
likely to be large within countries, but are likely to be relatively small between
countries.
Summary information about the dataset is provided in Supplementary Note 1,
including descriptive statistics of levels (Supplementary Table 3), annual changes
(Supplementary Table 2), and 2P changes (Supplementary Table 1) of our key
variables. We also provide estimates of pairwise correlations among levels
(Supplementary Table 9) and 2P changes (Supplementary Table 10) in our key
variables.
Regression models for well-being (overview). We estimate four different models
to characterize the relationship between country-level SWB and our six predictor
variables. Each model is suitable for estimation using a weighted least-squares
approach. One model predicts the relationship among countries, another predicts
within-country changes between our two time periods, and two approaches predict
year-to-year changes within countries. We use the 2P model in our primary ana-
lysis in order to remain conservative with our primary conclusions, and in order to
avoid the short-run effects of the global ﬁnancial crisis (GFC) in our estimates of
long-run trends, but we show results from the other models in Supplementary
Notes 1 and 3. For completeness, the four models and the standardization are
explained below. For each of these models, the corresponding estimates are
tabulated in Supplementary Note 2 both as raw coefﬁcients and secondly as unitless
standardized coefﬁcients.
As emphasized in the main text, we cannot identify and isolate independent
causal relationships between supports (predictor variables) and life evaluations.
Rather, our set of proxy variables, with their shared variance, captures one
projection of the true underlying processes. In the case of our Giving variable, we
err on the side of under-estimating the importance of giving by using the residual
from a regression of the underlying donations variable on an income measure. This
may in turn result in over-estimating the importance of income.
Regression models for well-being (static model). First, we consider the cross-
sectional (XS) relationship
Sit ¼ aþ
X6
j¼1
bjxjit þ ct þ νi þ εit ; ð1Þ
where Sit is the SWB in country i in year t; a is a global constant; xjit are the six
predictor variables; ct is a constant in a given year t for all countries; and νi+ εit is
an error term clustered at the country level. Here, bj are the regression coefﬁcients
describing the effects of interest. In estimating (1) we use country weighting
because we consider the political–cultural–economic dynamics to be distinct across
countries and therefore consider each country to be one sample unit. We cluster
errors at the country level to take into account the fact that we have multiple
observations (i.e., by year) for each country, but do not capture all country features
in the model. Our inclusion of year indicators (dummy variables) ct is to remove
variation related to global secular trends (e.g., average global economic growth) and
short-run global cycles (e.g., the GFC), so that our estimated bj capture the cross-
sectional variation.
In order to quantitatively compare these relationships bj across predictors j, we
calculate the standardized regression coefﬁcients βj %
σ j
σS
bj ; that is, we estimate the
standardized variable equation
Sit
σs
¼ ~aþ
X6
j¼1
βj
xjit
σ j
þ ~ct þ ~νi þ ~εit ; ð2Þ
where σs is the standard deviation of Sit across all country-year observations, but
again calculated with country weights to take into account the fact that not all
countries have the same number of observations (years). The standard deviation σj
of xjit is calculated the same way. Thus, βj should be interpreted as the number of
standard deviations of change in S associated with one standard deviation change
in xj.
Regression models for well-being (dynamic models). While (1) models the
variation across countries, we also generate models of changes over time in order to
project future changes based on past rates of change. We do this in three ways. Two
of them, ﬁxed effects (FE) and ﬁrst differences (FD), use the year-to-year changes
in the predictor variables for each country to explain year-to-year changes in SWB.
The third method (2P) considers only the longer-run difference for each country
from early in the Gallup World Poll data (2005–2007) to the most recent years
(2014–2016). Taking the means during each of these two periods excludes the acute
effects of the GFC and its recovery.
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Regression models for well-being (annual changes). First, we consider the year-
by-year changes, captured in an FE model by including an indicator (constant
offset) di for each country (this is equivalent to subtracting the mean value for each
country):
Sit ¼ aþ di þ
X6
j¼1
bFEj xjit þ νi þ εit : ð3Þ
Alternatively, we may model the 1-year changes in an FD equation, as follows:
ΔSit ¼
X6
j¼1
bFDj Δxjit þ νi þ εit : ð4Þ
With ﬁnite samples, (3) and (4) do not give identical estimates. Moreover,
because our panel is not perfectly balanced, some observations are dropped when
estimating (4). Because of this, and the inherent higher efﬁciency of the FE
estimator, we favor (3) but show estimates of both.
As described in the Methods section, we wish to be able to compare the
estimated effects of one predictor variable to another—that is, to ascribe relative
importance to changes in different predictor variables. For the FD estimator, this is
straightforward, as we can construct normalized versions of observed 1-year
changes, in analogy to (3):
ΔSit
σΔS
¼
X6
j¼1
βFDj
Δxjit
σΔxj
þ ~νi þ ~εit : ð5Þ
The term βj in (5) explains the distribution of 1-year changes in S, such that βj is
the number of standard deviations of change in ΔS associated with 1 s.d. change in
Δxj, where these variances are calculated across observed 1-year changes.
In order to express the relative importance of estimates from the FE estimator,
(3), we use the same standard deviations of FD to transform the bFEj in (3) to
βFEj %
σΔxj
σΔS
bFEj : ð6Þ
Estimating βFEj has the advantages over β
FD
j mentioned above (efﬁciency, more
inclusion) for FE.
Regression models for well-being (2P changes). The third method constructs an
equation with only two observations per country, the early period and the later
period (2005–2007 and 2014–2016), in order to model longer-run changes δxj and
δS. In this context, the FE and FD estimators are identical; thus, we write simply
δSit ¼
X6
j¼1
b2Pj δxjit þ νi þ εit : ð7Þ
Analogously to the methods above, we deﬁne the standardized coefﬁcients
β2Pj %
σδxj
σδS
b2Pj ð8Þ
using the standard deviation of longer-run changes across countries. This estimate
has fewer observations than those modeling annual changes, and the conﬁdence
intervals are slightly looser.
As mentioned in the Discussion, we also consider moderation effects between
variables in the 2P model by testing pairwise interaction terms, detailed in
Supplementary Note 3. We ﬁnd a signiﬁcant moderation effect only between GDP
and freedom of choice.
Regression models for well-being (results). Estimates of the models for life
evaluations are described in Supplementary Note 2 and summarized in Supple-
mentary Table 4. In addition, we report analogous estimates for our other measures
of well-being, namely positive affect (Supplementary Table 5), negative affect
(Supplementary Table 6), and affect balance (Supplementary Table 7). We also
carry out and explain an estimate at the regional level (reported in Supplementary
Table 11).
Recent trends (overview). We deﬁne future scenarios by projecting different
quantiles of recent country trends in predictor variables into the future. Rather
than deﬁning complex and arbitrary story lines, we represent the range of feasible
outcomes by deﬁning idealized scenarios. We denote the total feasible range of
possible rates of change as that encompassed by the 10th to 90th percentile
observed range among all countries. Thus, we use the assumption that, if a given
rate of change in a proxy variable was observed in 10% of all countries over the 11-
year observation period, it is feasible that the variable could change at this rate in
any country over the next three decades. This differs from the full range of possible
changes, for which we have no ﬁrst principles understanding, but which is likely to
be greater than our feasible range given the possibility of unforeseeable, radical
transformation. To better characterize the distribution of likely futures, we also
make projections using the 30th, 50th, and 70th percentiles of recent trends, but we
focus on the 10th and 90th percentiles for our primary analysis.
For the purpose of illustrating large changes in our predictor variables,
Supplementary Figure 6 shows recent trends (with 3-year smoothing) in the nine
countries which exhibited the most variation in each variable.
The estimation of recent trends in our predictor variables and in SWB is
complicated by two issues. First, the panel of available data is incomplete; that is,
there are data gaps for some country-year variable entries. Table 1 shows the
number of countries with data by year or period for our various approaches. In
order to estimate trends that are not biased by a changing composition of
countries, a subset of countries with complete data can be used, or data can be
appropriately weighted in order to account for features of the incomplete panel.
Secondly, the GFC had a signiﬁcant impact on some countries in 2008, yet these
effects were somewhat temporary. The short-term changes following the GFC may
not contribute constructively towards estimating the longer-run changes that might
inform scenarios to 2050. Fortunately, the Gallup World Poll time series is now
long enough that estimates can be made even after excluding several years
following the start of the GFC.
Recent trends (country estimates). We therefore consider the following three
estimation models of recent time trends in our key variables:
First, a differences model: Take averages for each country for each period
(2005–2007, 2014–2016), and calculate the difference. This avoids the GFC, but
entails a two-step process to calculate conﬁdence intervals for the differences.
Second, a 2P regression, excluding GFC model: A one-step method which
provides estimates of conﬁdence intervals is to carry out a regression
xit ¼ xi0 þ Biπt þ εit ; ð9Þ
where πt is an indicator variable for periods after/before the GFC:
πt ¼
1; t & 2014;
0; otherwise
!
ð10Þ
and where observations are estimated with weights
wit ¼
1
Nit' 2007
; t ' 2007;
0; 2008 ' t ' 2013;
1
Nit& 2014
; t & 2014:
0BB@ ð11Þ
Here Nit' 2007 is the number of observations of country i in the early period. The
point estimates of Bi in (9) are identical to the difference in period means for
country i, but the standard error is calculated correctly.
In order to convert the estimates Bi of change between the two periods to an
estimate of the annual rate of change, we divide by 9, the number of years between
the middles of the two periods.
Third, and lastly, an all-year (annual) regression model: The annual rate of
change can be estimated for country i and variable x using all years t for which xit
Table 1 Completeness of panel data
Year Any data All data Balanced ≥2007 Any <2008 Any >2013 Any (2P)
2005 27 21 118 109
2006 85 77 118 109
2007 99 92 64 118 109
2008 104 100 64
2009 109 105 64
2010 118 110 64
2011 138 130 64
2012 134 122 64
2013 130 119 64
2014 137 122 64 129 109
2015 136 120 64 129 109
2016 133 116 64 129 109
The ﬁrst column lists the number of countries with coverage within our core set of variables for
each year of the Gallup World Poll, after some imputation done in accordance with the data
appendix of Helliwell et al.8. The All data column lists the number of countries with all of our
core variables. The Balanced column shows the number of countries in the largest balanced
(complete, rectangular) panel covering all years after 2006. For our two-period model, we use
the countries with at least one observation in the early period and at least one observation in the
later period
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was observed, according to the following equation:
xit ¼ ai þ bit þ εit : ð12Þ
Recent trends (global and regional estimates). For directly estimating global (or
regional, multi-country) trends, we follow a similar procedure as the 2P and annual
approaches described above, but using two alternative approaches to weighting
observations. In one, we use weights which count each country equally, and in
another we multiply the weights described previously by country populations.
Thus, we have four variants of estimated global trends: for each variable there is a
2P version and an annual version, and for each of those there are country weights
and population weights.
By contrast, we consider countries as individual observations when thinking
about the global distribution of trends, and thus calculate, for example, the 10th
percentile trend from the unweighted set of countries.
Recent trends (results). We estimate the 2P and annual models for each country,
and for the world as a whole. Table 2 present the results. In general, we ﬁnd
excellent agreement between the 2P and annual estimates. Although the annual
estimates use more observations and should therefore be more efﬁcient, they have
slightly higher standard errors, likely reﬂecting the short-term variation during the
GFC.
Overall, the trend in life evaluations, measured as per-year change on an 11-
point scale, is very small (insigniﬁcant). The material variables income and life
expectancy are globally increasing signiﬁcantly, according to all our speciﬁcations.
There are also signiﬁcant global trends in the non-material variables, whose
changes are measured as annual change on a 0–1 scale. Freedom and corruption
are both improving in all speciﬁcations, while social support is getting worse
(diminishing), and signiﬁcantly so averaged across countries. Thus, the predictor
variables are signiﬁcantly trending but not all in an optimistic or pessimistic
direction.
Table 2 also reports, for each variable, the fraction of countries with statistically
signiﬁcant (p ≤ .05) rates of change. These fractions are in all cases considerably
>5%, suggesting that trends, both positive and negative, are sustained (and real).
This fact is central to our argument in that it supports our assumption that we can
gauge reasonable rates of change based on the distribution of changes in the recent
past. The remaining rows of Table 2 show the 10th and 90th, and intermediate,
percentiles from these distributions. We consider these to correspond to plausible
optimistic and pessimistic trends in the future scenarios. In general, these values
are more extreme for the annual model than the 2P model, and we use the latter in
order to remain conservative in our scenarios.
Future scenarios. We present three sets of scenarios, each with more and less
optimistic and pessimistic cases. Two sets focus on changes in material circum-
stances—the OECD macroeconomic projections, and our material variable trends,
which project 10th, 30th, 50th, 70th, and 90th percentile rates of change for all
countries. The third scenario pair projects the same quantiles of rates of change for
our non-material predictor variables. Note that future changes in predictor vari-
ables could potentially occur more rapidly than has occurred in any country over
the observed timeframe, but our approach focuses on the most likely range based
on past experience.
The OECD projections use two global economic scenarios, devised to explore
possible futures for major environmental challenges, including climate change.
From these Shared Socioeconomic Pathways27, we bracket the range of possibilities
for income and population growth by selecting the two most contrasting scenarios,
the rapid population growth, slow economic growth, weak convergence (SSP3) and
the slow population growth, rapid economic growth, strong convergence (SSP5) as
our OECD pessimistic and OECD optimistic Material trends scenarios,
respectively.
We project each of the sets of trends forward to 2050, starting from 2016 values
in each country. Country level means derived from dichotomous variables have
natural saturation points at 0 and 1; otherwise, there are no restrictions on
projected values. We use OECD projections of population change by country in
order to calculate globally averaged life evaluations for all humans.
To test the robustness of our ﬁndings, we undertake each of our projections
using alternative models. Tabular summary data for the three sets of scenarios
using 2P, FE, and XS coefﬁcients are given in Supplementary Tables 12 and 13, and
Supplementary Table 14, respectively. These same values are also presented in
summary plots in Supplementary Figure 7, for both weighted and unweighted
means.
We also provide maps to represent the population-weighted projections in our
scenarios using our three different sets of coefﬁcients. Supplementary Figure 2
shows the same cases as in our main text, which use the 2P coefﬁcients, but
includes in the middle row the material trend scenarios. They are not included in
the main text due to their geographic uniformity. Supplementary Figure 3 and 4
show our projections under the alternative speciﬁcations of XS and FE coefﬁcients,
respectively. Finally, Supplementary Figure 5 shows projections for affect balance,
using the 2P coefﬁcients.
Code availability. No special code was used in our analysis, which proceeded as
described in our methods. Requests for scripts needed to reproduce our results will
be reviewed and made available on a case-by-case basis by the corresponding
author.
Data availability
Our country-mean annual time series data come from the 2017 World Happiness
Report. Its Statistical Appendix8 contains annual country averages of several
variables for the entire span of the Gallup World Poll, which began with partial
coverage in 2005. Helliwell et al.8 provide further information on the data and on
possible imputation methods to ﬁll gaps in some of the coverage.
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Table 2 Estimated recent global trends and distribution
(1) Life
today
(2)
−Affect
(3)
+Affect
(4) Log(GDP/
capita)
(5) Life
expectancy
(6)
Giving
(7) Freedom of
choice
(8)
Corruption
(9) Social
support
Global trend (country
weights): 2P
.003 .002† .0002 .018† .29† −.0004 .004† −.002 −.002*
(.005) (.0006) (.0005) (.002) (.020) (.001) (.0010) (.0009) (.0006)
Global trend (country
weights): annual
−.002 .002† −8e−05 .015† .27† −.0006 .003* −.002 −.002†
(.006) (.0006) (.0006) (.002) (.022) (.001) (.001) (.0009) (.0007)
Global trend (pop’n weights):
2P
−.006 .002 .0002 .037† .25† −.0006 .004* −.003* −.0007
(.023) (.002) (.0008) (.009) (.023) (.002) (.001) (.001) (.0009)
Global trend (pop’n weights):
annual
−.012 .003 −.0003 .033* .22† −.002 .003 −.004 −.001
(.025) (.002) (.0009) (.011) (.026) (.003) (.002) (.001) (.0009)
Fraction p≤.05: 2P .32 .23 .18 .76 1.00 .27 .27 .34 .21
Fraction p≤.05: annual .29 .31 .25 .81 .98 .30 .33 .31 .26
10th %ile: 2P −.073 −.005 −.008 −.003 .12 −.016 −.008 −.013 −.008
10th %ile: annual −.099 −.005 −.009 −.004 .12 −.018 −.010 −.018 −.012
30th %ile: 2P −.017 −.002 −.002 .008 .16 −.006 −.002 −.006 −.003
30th %ile: annual −.037 −.0006 −.003 .009 .16 −.007 −.002 −.009 −.004
50th %ile: 2P .006 .001 .0006 .017 .22 −.001 .002 −.003 −.001
50th %ile: annual −.0002 .003 .0009 .020 .23 −.003 .004 −.003 −.001
70th %ile: 2P .034 .005 .003 .028 .32 .004 .011 .001 .0006
70th %ile: annual .031 .009 .005 .029 .33 .003 .011 .002 .003
90th %ile: 2P .077 .010 .009 .043 .55 .016 .017 .010 .006
90th %ile: annual .086 .018 .012 .047 .51 .017 .021 .011 .010
The ﬁrst four rows show estimated global trends for the period 2005–2016 and between the periods 2005–2007 and 2014–2016. The 2P versions of the ﬁve quantiles of the across-countries
distributions are used to build our future scenarios
Signiﬁcance: †.1%, *1% 5%, 10%
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Supplementary Figure 1: Projections using alternate model specifications
incorporating interaction eﬀects. The top panel is based on our preferred model,
while the second and third show projections made using alternative specifications (4)
and (8) in Supplementary Table 8.
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A: OECD optimistic material trends (changes) B: OECD pessimistic material trends (changes)
C: Material trends (optimistic) D: Material trends (pessimistic)
E: Non-material trends (optimistic) F: Non-material trends (pessimistic)
Supplementary Figure 2: Geographic distribution of changes in life evalua-
tion (2050 scenarios, 2P coeﬃcients). Projections based on two-period (2P)
coeﬃcients.
4
A: OECD optimistic material trends (changes) B: OECD pessimistic material trends (changes)
C: Material trends (optimistic) D: Material trends (pessimistic)
E: Non-material trends (optimistic) F: Non-material trends (pessimistic)
Supplementary Figure 3: Geographic distribution of changes in life evaluation
(2050 scenarios, XS coeﬃcients). Projections based on cross-sectional (XS)
coeﬃcients.
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A: OECD optimistic material trends (changes) B: OECD pessimistic material trends (changes)
C: Material trends (optimistic) D: Material trends (pessimistic)
E: Non-material trends (optimistic) F: Non-material trends (pessimistic)
Supplementary Figure 4: Geographic distribution of changes in life evaluation
(2050 scenarios, FE coeﬃcients). Projections based fixed-eﬀect (FE) coeﬃcients.
6
A: OECD optimistic material trends (changes) B: OECD pessimistic material trends (changes)
C: Material trends (optimistic) D: Material trends (pessimistic)
E: Non-material trends (optimistic) F: Non-material trends (pessimistic)
Supplementary Figure 5: Geographic distribution of changes in aﬀect bal-
ance (2050 scenarios, 2P coeﬃcients). Projections based on two-period (2P)
coeﬃcients.
7
Supplementary Figure 6: Strong trends in life evaluation, aﬀect balance, and
predictor variables. Values are smoothed with a 3-year rolling average. Countries
listed are those with the largest changes, in each case, during the observation period.
These developments are shown for illustration only; the trends used for our projec-
tions are taken from the full distribution across countries of average rates of change
over the entire period.
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Supplementary Figure 7: Range of scenario outcomes for global mean life
evaluations in 2050. (A) and (C) show mean life evaluation across countries, on
a 0–10 scale , while (B) and (D) show population-weighted global means. (A) and
(B) are calculated using our estimated coeﬃcients in the two-period model, while
(C) and (D) are from our fixed eﬀects model. In each panel, the coloured bars show
the ranges of feasible life evaluations attributable solely to changes spanning the
pessimistic to optimistic scenarios for the each of the nonmaterial trends (green),
material trends (orange), and OECD factors (blue).
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Supplementary Tables
10
Country-weighted Pop’n-weighted
µ std µ std min max 10%ile ddy 90%ile
d
dy
 Life today .027±.049 .53  .21±.19 .56  1.60 1.37  .099 .086
   a↵ect .020±.005 .057 .034±.017 .056  .10 .18  .005 .018
 + a↵ect .002±.005 .053 .0004±.009 .041  .14 .13  .009 .012
 log(GDP/capita) .16±.016 .17 .25±.063 .18  .35 .68  .004 .047
 Life expectancy 2.6±.18 1.96 2.4±.19 1.43 .53 13.4 .12 .51
 Giving  .003±.010 .11 .007±.017 .092  .24 .32  .018 .017
 Freedom of choice .034±.009 .095 .038±.013 .081  .30 .24  .010 .021
 Corruption  .021±.008 .086  .030±.015 .076  .34 .17  .018 .011
 Social support  .017±.006 .061  .006±.010 .048  .24 .16  .012 .010
Supplementary Table 1: Summary statistics: two-period changes. As in Sup-
plementary Table 2, but showing changes between the mean level from 2005–2007
in each country, and its mean between 2014–2016. Country-weighted values show
a 17% increase in GDP/capita (i.e., log increase of 0.16), a 2.6-year increase in life
expectancy, a 1.7% decrease in aﬃrmative responses to the social support question,
and no significant change in life evaluations.
11
Country-weighted Pop’n-weighted
µ std µ std min max
 Life today .002±.015 .39  .014±.031 .34  2.00 1.65
   a↵ect .003±.002 .047 .004±.003 .039  .17 .27
 + a↵ect .001±.002 .051 .0002±.004 .046  .22 .20
 log(GDP/capita) .019±.001 .039 .036±.004 .037  .44 .21
 Life expectancy .29±.010 .27 .26±.010 .19  .75 1.73
 Giving  .002±.002 .070 .0004±.007 .071  .30 .44
 Freedom of choice .005±.003 .071 .004±.009 .076  .30 .32
 Corruption  .004±.003 .059  .003±.003 .044  .27 .25
 Social support  .0007±.002 .054 .001±.005 .050  .36 .21
Supplementary Table 2: Summary statistics: annual changes. As in Supplemen-
tary Table 3, but showing statistics describing the annual changes across countries,
generated by taking first diﬀerences in every case when a variable is observed in a
country over two successive years. All values are given as the change per year.
Country-weighted Pop’n-weighted
µ std µ std min max N
Life today 5.4±.037 1.15 5.3±.069 .95 2.7 8.0 1190
  a↵ect .26±.003 .078 .25±.007 .071 .10 .70 1190
+ a↵ect .71±.003 .11 .73±.007 .091 .36 .94 1190
log(GDP/capita) 9.1±.044 1.23 9.1±.058 .96 6.4 11.7 1190
Life expectancy 61.0±.31 8.7 61.8±.51 7.2 36.2 76.4 1190
Giving  .0003±.005 .16  .004±.013 .16  .32 .54 1190
Freedom of choice .72±.005 .14 .74±.008 .12 .26 .98 1190
Corruption .75±.007 .19 .82±.009 .12 .035 .98 1190
Social support .81±.004 .12 .76±.013 .13 .29 .99 1190
Supplementary Table 3: Summary statistics: annual time series. For each sub-
jective well-being metric and predictor variable, the mean (µ) and standard deviation
(std) among all countries are given (Country-weighted). The mean and standard de-
viation are also given after weighting the value in each country by its population,
in order to estimate the average value for all humans (Pop’n-weighted). Also shown
are the minimum (min) and maximum (max) among all countries in the dataset, as
well as the total number of country-year observations (N).
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Life today
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
log(GDP/capita) .35† .93† 1.17† .66+ .36† .96† .19+ .14† .095†
(.062) (.23) (.30) (.37) (.065) (.24) (.11) (.034) (.024)
Social support 2.2† 1.38† 1.05† 2.6† .23† .15† .29† .14† .19†
(.40) (.32) (.29) (.65) (.042) (.034) (.072) (.040) (.044)
Life expectancy .030†  .046  .018  .015 .22†  .34  .060 .030  .031
(.008) (.019) (.024) (.015) (.060) (.14) (.059) (.025) (.013)
Freedom of choice 1.03? .83† .65† 1.70? .13? .11† .33? .12? .15†
(.33) (.24) (.20) (.54) (.042) (.031) (.10) (.036) (.045)
Giving .92† .26 .31+ .016 .13† .036 .003 .058+ .048
(.27) (.20) (.17) (.39) (.038) (.028) (.080) (.031) (.037)
Corruption  .67  .43+  .18  1.01  .11  .070+  .17  .028  .065+
(.29) (.25) (.28) (.48) (.047) (.040) (.081) (.041) (.037)
model XS FE FD 2P XS FE 2P FD FE
normalization XS XS 2P FD FD
Year f.e. 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
Nclusters 149 149 139 149 149 139 149
obs. 1212 1212 971 108 1212 1212 108 971 1212
R2(adj) .755 .130 .060 .347 .755 .130 .347 .064 .130
R2(overall) .64 .64 .64
Significance: 0.1%† 1%? 5% 10%+
Supplementary Table 4: Estimates of life evaluations. Estimates of models ac-
counting for cross-sectional (XS) and temporal (FE, FD, 2P) variation in life evalua-
tions are shown (columns 1–4), along with standardized coeﬃcient versions (columns
5-9) of the same estimates. The estimates in column (4) are used for our main pro-
jections to relate changes in our predictor variables to changes in life evaluations.
The relative importance of those predictor variables for explaining variation in life
evaluations can be gauged by looking at the standardized coeﬃcients. We prefer
column (7) as a measure of explanatory power for changes over time.
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A↵ect balance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
log(GDP/capita)  .018 .031 .13 .13  .14 .24 .23 .100† .016
(.013) (.043) (.050) (.059) (.10) (.34) (.11) (.028) (.023)
Social support .50† .27† .20† .049 .40† .22† .033 .15† .19†
(.071) (.070) (.057) (.15) (.056) (.055) (.098) (.042) (.049)
Life expectancy  .0004  .008  .005  .008  .020  .43  .19 .038  .027
(.002) (.004) (.005) (.006) (.11) (.21) (.13) (.026) (.013)
Freedom of choice .40† .16? .10? .035 .38† .15? .040 .11? .15?
(.067) (.049) (.036) (.10) (.064) (.047) (.12) (.036) (.046)
Giving .16† .052 .027 .18? .17† .054 .23? .028 .050
(.044) (.049) (.040) (.071) (.046) (.051) (.087) (.042) (.047)
Corruption  .074+  .048  .026  .15  .090+  .059  .15  .024  .037
(.038) (.045) (.048) (.093) (.047) (.055) (.094) (.039) (.035)
model XS FE FD 2P XS FE 2P FD FE
normalization XS XS 2P FD FD
Year f.e. 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
Nclusters 149 149 139 149 149 139 149
obs. 1208 1208 965 108 1208 1208 108 965 1208
R2(adj) .468 .083 .043 .151 .468 .083 .151 .049 .083
R2(overall) .28 .28 .28
Significance: 0.1%† 1%? 5% 10%+
Supplementary Table 5: Estimates of positive aﬀect. See Supplementary Table
4.
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+ a↵ect
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
log(GDP/capita)  .003 .070? .076+ .10?  .037 .77? .31? .074 .056?
(.010) (.022) (.040) (.033) (.11) (.24) (.100) (.037) (.017)
Social support .24† .089 .033  .024 .27† .099  .028 .035 .094
(.052) (.041) (.036) (.095) (.058) (.046) (.11) (.040) (.044)
Life expectancy .0006  .002  .002  .004+ .046  .14  .16+ .009  .009
(.001) (.001) (.003) (.002) (.11) (.11) (.093) (.018) (.008)
Freedom of choice .33† .11† .090† .092+ .44† .15† .18+ .13† .16†
(.042) (.029) (.027) (.050) (.056) (.039) (.099) (.040) (.041)
Giving .16† .085? .077? .11 .24† .13? .22 .12? .12?
(.031) (.032) (.028) (.043) (.047) (.048) (.090) (.042) (.046)
Corruption .027 .002  .009 .008 .046 .003 .013  .012 .002
(.029) (.030) (.031) (.057) (.049) (.052) (.097) (.037) (.035)
model XS FE FD 2P XS FE 2P FD FE
normalization XS XS 2P FD FD
Year f.e. 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
Nclusters 149 149 139 149 149 139 149
obs. 1209 1209 966 108 1209 1209 108 966 1209
R2(adj) .482 .089 .036 .219 .482 .089 .219 .037 .089
R2(overall) .23 .23 .23
Significance: 0.1%† 1%? 5% 10%+
Supplementary Table 6: Estimates of negative aﬀect. See Supplementary Table
4.
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  a↵ect
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
log(GDP/capita) .014+ .040  .047+  .026 .22+ .61  .070  .075† .033
(.008) (.031) (.025) (.040) (.12) (.48) (.11) (.023) (.026)
Social support  .26†  .18†  .17†  .064  .40†  .29†  .066  .20†  .20†
(.046) (.052) (.047) (.092) (.072) (.080) (.095) (.055) (.057)
Life expectancy .0009 .006+ .003 .004 .10 .65+ .13  .050+ .032+
(.001) (.003) (.003) (.004) (.11) (.34) (.14) (.029) (.017)
Freedom of choice  .072  .043  .015 .058  .14  .080 .10  .022  .062
(.046) (.035) (.022) (.073) (.085) (.065) (.13) (.035) (.051)
Giving .004 .034 .048+  .078 .008 .070  .15 .080+ .050
(.031) (.029) (.025) (.049) (.063) (.061) (.094) (.041) (.044)
Corruption .10† .049+ .017 .15? .24† .12+ .23? .026 .060+
(.025) (.027) (.030) (.056) (.061) (.065) (.087) (.038) (.033)
model XS FE FD 2P XS FE 2P FD FE
normalization XS XS 2P FD FD
Year f.e. 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
Nclusters 149 149 139 149 149 139 149
obs. 1211 1211 970 108 1211 1211 108 970 1211
R2(adj) .221 .088 .046 .045 .221 .088 .045 .052 .088
R2(overall) .002 .002 .002
Significance: 0.1%† 1%? 5% 10%+
Supplementary Table 7: Estimates of aﬀect balance. See Supplementary Table
4.
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Life today
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
log(GDP/capita) .19+ .21+ .20+ .24 .19+ .19+ .21+ .24
(.11) (.11) (.11) (.11) (.11) (.11) (.11) (.11)
Social support .29† .21 .29† .27† .29† .30† .29† .18+
(.072) (.098) (.072) (.073) (.072) (.079) (.072) (.10)
Life expectancy  .060  .055  .062  .10+  .061  .064  .064  .091
(.059) (.058) (.061) (.063) (.059) (.059) (.060) (.062)
Freedom of choice .33? .33? .33? .48† .33? .32? .30? .57†
(.10) (.11) (.10) (.12) (.10) (.11) (.11) (.13)
Giving .003  .005 .005 .020 .006 .004 .030  .0003
(.080) (.082) (.083) (.076) (.081) (.081) (.10) (.072)
Corruption  .17  .18  .18+  .17  .15+  .17  .17  .032
(.081) (.081) (.11) (.083) (.087) (.082) (.082) (.096)
log(GDP/capita) ⇥ Social support .11 .14
(.10) (.097)
log(GDP/capita) ⇥ Corruption .015  .22+
(.11) (.12)
log(GDP/capita) ⇥ Freedom of choice  .26?  .39†
(.099) (.12)
Social support ⇥ Corruption .037
(.064)
Social support ⇥ Freedom of choice  .045
(.072)
Freedom of choice ⇥ Giving  .077
(.097)
model 2P 2P 2P 2P 2P 2P 2P 2P
AIC 267 268 269 263 269 269 268 263
obs. 108 108 108 108 108 108 108 108
R2(adj) .347 .346 .340 .376 .341 .342 .345 .387
Significance: 0.1%† 1%? 5% 10%+
Supplementary Table 8: Estimates of life evaluations including interaction
terms. Column (1) reproduces our preferred 2P model (column 7 of Supplementary
Table 4). Columns (2) through (7) are the same but with the addition of one inter-
action term each. Column (8) includes all terms between material and non-material
predictor variables. All coeﬃcients are presented normalized to 2P variation.
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Life today .51† .59†  .21? .83† .77†  .47† .57† .23? .75†
(<10 5) (<10 5) (.007) (<10 5) (<10 5) (<10 5) (<10 5) (.004) (<10 5)
A↵ect balance .90†  .78† .28† .23?  .37† .64† .35† .49†
(<10 5) (<10 5) (.0004) (.004) (<10 5) (<10 5) (1e-05) (<10 5)
$+$ a↵ect  .44† .35† .30†  .33† .69† .42† .49†
(<10 5) (1e-05) (.0002) (3e-05) (<10 5) (<10 5) (<10 5)
$-$ a↵ect  .075  .057 .28†  .33†  .12  .31†
(.36) (.48) (.0004) (2e-05) (.15) (7e-05)
log(GDP/capita) .83†  .39† .41†  .014 .71†
(<10 5) (<10 5) (<10 5) (.87) (<10 5)
Life expectancy  .29† .36† .059 .63†
(.0003) (1e-05) (.47) (<10 5)
Corruption  .54†  .32†  .22?
(<10 5) (8e-05) (.006)
Freedom of choice .41† .42†
(<10 5) (<10 5)
Giving .087
(.29)
Significance: 0.1%† 1%? 5% 10%+
Supplementary Table 9: Pairwise correlations of levels. Pearson correlation
coeﬃcients for our country-mean values of our main variables
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Life today .41† .33†  .32† .39†  .043  .30? .46† .11 .43†
(<10 5) (.0003) (.0003) (1e-05) (.64) (.001) (<10 5) (.22) (<10 5)
A↵ect balance .78†  .80† .30?  .11  .21 .17+ .17+ .15+
(<10 5) (<10 5) (.001) (.24) (.026) (.060) (.072) (.091)
+ a↵ect  .25? .39†  .023  .10 .29? .22 .064
(.005) (1e-05) (.80) (.29) (.002) (.018) (.48)
  a↵ect  .091 .14 .23  .002  .056  .18+
(.32) (.12) (.016) (.98) (.55) (.052)
log(GDP/capita) .14  .15 .39† .058 .27?
(.13) (.13) (2e-05) (.54) (.003)
Life expectancy .011 .093 .082  .025
(.90) (.32) (.38) (.79)
Corruption  .39†  .061  .008
(2e-05) (.53) (.94)
Freedom of choice .14 .061
(.14) (.51)
Giving .063
(.50)
Significance: 0.1%† 1%? 5% 10%+
Supplementary Table 10: Pairwise correlations of changes. Pearson correlation
coeﬃcients for two-period changes of our main variables
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Life today
(1) (2) (3)
log(GDP/capita) .35† .23† .19
(.062) (.069) (.083)
Social support 2.2† 1.59† 3.1†
(.40) (.35) (.53)
Life expectancy .030†  .012 .009
(.008) (.011) (.035)
Freedom of choice 1.03? .77 1.60
(.33) (.32) (1.04)
Corruption  .67 .25 .18
(.29) (.33) (.53)
Giving .92† 1.09 .12
(.27) (.73) (.50)
model XS XS XS
normalization
region All countries Sub-Saharan Africa C.I.S.
Year f.e. 12 12 12
obs. 1212 284 116
R2(adj) .755 .335 .629
Nclusters 149 39 11
Significance: 0.1%† 1%? 5% 10%+
Supplementary Table 11: XS model estimated for regions. Column 1 is repeated
from Supplementary Table 4. Column 2 is the same model estimated for the subset
of countries in sub-Saharan Africa, and Column 3 is the same but estimated for the
Commonwealth of Independent States, ie former nations of the Soviet Union.
scenario min max mean (nat’l) mean (pop’n) 2016value (nat’l) 2016value (pop’n)
Material trends (OECD optimistic) 4.24 7.69 6.05 6.04 5.35 5.24
Material trends (OECD pessimistic) 3.52 7.73 5.72 5.66 5.35 5.24
Material trends (optimistic) 3.67 8.31 6.12 6.01 5.35 5.24
Material trends (pessimistic) 2.76 7.40 5.21 5.10 5.35 5.24
Non-material trends (optimistic) 4.50 8.61 6.86 6.84 5.35 5.24
Non-material trends (pessimistic) 1.09 5.57 3.52 3.44 5.35 5.24
Supplementary Table 12: Scenario projections using two-period (2P) coeﬃcients
scenario min max mean (nat’l) mean (pop’n) 2016value (nat’l) 2016value (pop’n)
Material trends (OECD optimistic) 3.97 7.40 5.91 5.95 5.35 5.24
Material trends (OECD pessimistic) 3.47 7.72 5.77 5.74 5.35 5.24
Material trends (optimistic) 3.56 8.21 6.01 5.90 5.35 5.24
Material trends (pessimistic) 2.60 7.24 5.05 4.94 5.35 5.24
Non-material trends (optimistic) 4.15 8.03 6.22 6.16 5.35 5.24
Non-material trends (pessimistic) 1.83 6.39 4.27 4.18 5.35 5.24
Supplementary Table 13: Scenario projections using fixed-eﬀect (FE) coeﬃcients
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scenario min max mean (nat’l) mean (pop’n) 2016value (nat’l) 2016value (pop’n)
Material trends (OECD optimistic) 4.36 8.27 6.39 6.34 5.35 5.24
Material trends (OECD pessimistic) 3.39 7.78 5.71 5.62 5.35 5.24
Material trends (optimistic) 3.98 8.63 6.43 6.32 5.35 5.24
Material trends (pessimistic) 2.98 7.63 5.43 5.32 5.35 5.24
Non-material trends (optimistic) 4.83 8.72 6.97 6.93 5.35 5.24
Non-material trends (pessimistic) 0.99 5.51 3.42 3.33 5.35 5.24
Supplementary Table 14: Scenario projections using cross-section (XS) coeﬃcients
21
Supplementary Note 1 (Descriptive statistics)
Our main text focuses on one primary measure of subjective well-being (SWB),
namely the cognitive evaluation of life question called “Cantril’s Ladder.” However,
this supplement includes analysis of two other dimensions of SWB, positive and
negative aﬀect, and the diﬀerence between them, “aﬀect balance.” For more details,
again see [8].
Supplementary Table 3 shows summary statistics for these data, while Supple-
mentary Table 2 shows summary statistics for country changes between successive
years (first diﬀerences, or FD), where they are available. Supplementary Table 1
shows summary statistics for diﬀerences between country means over the period
2014–2016 and corresponding means over the period 2005-2007; we call these our
two-period (2P) estimates.
Pairwise correlations
The simplest measure of the predictive relationships we explore and exploit is a
bivariate correlation. Supplementary Table 9 shows pair-wise correlations (Pearson
coeﬃcients) among country means for our key variables. Supplementary Table 10
shows pair-wise correlations (Pearson coeﬃcients) among changes in our key variables
between the two periods in our two-period (2P) data.
While country averages of life evaluations are, among our predictor variables,
most closely correlated (Supplementary Table 9) with levels of per capita income,
changes in life evaluations are more closely correlated (Supplementary Table 10) with
changes in social support (R ⇡ .43) or freedom (R ⇡ .46) than they are with changes
in income (R ⇡ .39).
22
Supplementary Note 2 (Model estimates)
The four models, described in Methods, are identified as “XS” (static model), “FE”
(annual changes, fixed eﬀects), “FD” (annual changes, first diﬀerences), and “2P”
(two-period) and estimated for cognitive evaluations of life in Supplementary Table
4. In our favored dynamic model (2P), changes in “giving” and life expectancy do not
predict significant changes in average life evaluation. Tables 5–7 report analogous
estimates for the other measures of SWB. In each case, the first four columns present
estimates of raw coeﬃcients (b, in the discussion above), while the remaining columns
show   coeﬃcients standardized in one of three ways. We consider column (7) to
give the best indication of the relative importance of diﬀerent predictor variables for
explaining changes in SWB, and we use the corresponding raw coeﬃcients in column
(4) for our primary scenario projections.
While the importance of income, as represented by standardized coeﬃcients in our
model, is lower in the dynamic model than in the cross-sectional one, the underlying
eﬀect size is actually larger. That is, a 10% increase in income per capita accounts
for an increase in life evaluations of 0.066 (on an 11-point scale) with the dynamic 2P
model (i.e., within a country), while a 10% diﬀerence in income per capita accounts
for a diﬀerence of only 0.035 in the static model (i.e., across countries). In the case
of our models of year-to-year changes (FD and FE), the dynamic eﬀect is larger
still. The latter finding may reflect the impacts of economic fluctuations in the
business cycle and the 2008 financial crisis, which our two-period model expressly
avoids. More generally, the quantitative diﬀerence we observe is consistent with other
evidence that income tends to aﬀect well-being more strongly in the short term than
over the long run [e.g., 19, 23]. Despite this possible exaggeration of the eﬀect of
GDP, which may overestimate the SWB gains to be made from a longer-term rise of
GDP, we use the time-series model coeﬃcients in the scenarios that follow.
Estimates for country regions
In light of the hypothesis that life evaluations should depend more on income in places
with lower incomes, Supplementary Table 11 shows estimates of the XS model for
sub-Saharan Africa and for the Commonwealth of Independent States. Both regions
have a suﬃcient number of countries to carry out the estimate; however, fewer coeﬃ-
cients are found to be statistically significant with the smaller samples. Contrary to
the hypothesis, the ratio of coeﬃcients on GDP/capita and social support are sim-
ilar or smaller in the sub-regions as in the global estimate. For this reason, and to
achieve reasonable precision in our estimates, we do not split up the planet according
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to levels of development in the primary estimates of our models.
Supplementary Note 3 (Robustness tests of interac-
tion eﬀects)
In order to test for interaction (sometimes called moderation) eﬀects between our
predictor variables, we focus on the four statistically significant variables in our
dynamic 2P model used for our primary analysis. Three of these variables are “non-
material”, while one, log(GDP/capita), is “material”. Therefore, of the pair-wise
combinations among them, three interactions could indicate a problem with our
separation of non-material scenarios from material scenarios, while the remaining
three interactions concern only the specification within the non-material model.
To best assess the size of any interaction eﬀects in our baseline model, we intro-
duce six new normalized variables (i.e., all pair-wise combinations of four predictor
variables) one-by-one into the normalized-coeﬃcient 2P model. As shown in columns
(2) to (7) of Supplementary Table 8, we find non-significant eﬀects for all but one
of them. In the case of log(GDP/capita)⇥Freedom of choice (column 4) a signif-
icant interaction eﬀect is estimated. Apart from the interaction itself, there is no
qualitative (nor significant quantitative) change in the other estimated parameters,
as compared with our baseline model (shown in column 1). Because we recognize
that our predictor variables are only proxies for material and non-material drivers of
life quality, and that they are likely to exhibit multicollinearity, we interpret these
findings as relatively reassuring in that our projections, though necessarily crude,
represent a reasonable approach. In our 2P analysis, when only the material vari-
ables or the non-material variables, but not both, are changing in any scenario, the
significant interaction term will remain zero by construction.
We also estimate a version of the model including all the interactions between
our (statistically significant) material and non-material RHSvs. This estimate is
shown in column (8) of Supplementary Table 8. In this case, there is a particularly
significant interaction between GDP/capita and Freedom of choice.
We emphasize that our data set (119 countries) is too small to conduct model
selection procedures, and that comparing models for quality of fit is not a well-
constrained undertaking. A formal test of interaction eﬀects should likely stop at a
test of significance of interaction coeﬃcients in columns (2) to (7) in order to limit
the likelihood of finding spurious relationships. Were the data extensive enough
to expand the model beyond the original 6 predictors, numerous other specifications
accommodating nonlinear terms and other available national-level variables would be
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equally reasonable candidates to specifications that are expanded using interaction
terms. For this reason, we constrained our base model to a specification already
established in the literature.
Nevertheless, in order to compare the alternate specifications, Supplementary
Table 8 shows the Akaike information criterion (AIC) for each model. Lower values
of the AIC indicate a better tradeoﬀ between goodness-of-fit and model simplicity.
Only two models, in columns (4) and (8), have a lower AIC than our baseline model
(column 1). To assess the impact on our projections of including interaction terms,
we repeated our 2P projection calculations using these two models. The results are
shown in Supplementary Figure 1. The top panel shows our preferred projection
from the main text. The second panel shows projections based on column (4) of
Supplementary Table 8, which includes the interaction term between GDP/capita
and Freedom of choice. The primary diﬀerence from our preferred model is that the
projected range of non-material projection outcomes is even larger than in our pre-
ferred version. In contrast, the lower panel shows the projections based on column
(8), in which all the “conflating” interaction terms between material and non-material
statistically significant predictor variables are included. In this case, there is a reduc-
tion in the 90/10 range of projections in the non-material scenario, particularly in
the outcome of the most optimistic non-material trends. However, the 30/70 range
remains quite similar to our preferred model, and our conclusions remain robust
in that the range of our projected distributions in the non-material scenario is far
greater than those of the two material scenarios. Given that the AIC is the same as
for model (4) which shows a very large range of non-material projections, we main-
tain our preference for the intermediate results of model (1), particularly given that
it is the simplest model and therefore least prone to over-fitting.
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